Oil, Libyans' Bargaining Chip

Conflict over Libya’s oil sector has become a proxy for numerous other conflicts that are working themselves out in post-uprising Libya. 

There was great hope in early 2012 that oil and gas revenues, which had rebounded fairly quickly after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, would allow Libya to finance its own reconstruction and transition to democracy. Beneath this optimism, however, were troubling indications of the problems that were to beset Libya’s oil industry over the coming months. On April 23, 2012, protesters occupied the Benghazi headquarters of the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, demanding greater transparency over oil revenues and more jobs for the city’s residents. While this protest ended two weeks later with little impact on oil production, the grievances that fueled it continue to drive the protests, strikes, and violence that are causing dramatic declines in Libya’s oil production and associated revenues. Instead of facilitating a democratic transition, the oil industry has been plagued by ongoing conflict that has come to reflect and embody many other unresolved issues in post-revolution Libya.

You can read the full article on Sada's website here.

A Crumbling Salafi Strategy

This is linking to an article I published at Sada in August, 2013.

Ennahda has sought to engage Tunisia’s Salafi groups, but that approach has only undermined the party’s authority amid growing violence.

In the wake of its electoral victory, Tunisia’s ruling Islamist party, Ennahda, opened the political space to conservative movements that stood further to their political right. The party encouraged Salafi groups to renounce violence, organize parties, and join the political process. This was a radical change from the stance of the interim government, which had denied permits to Salafi parties, questioning their commitment to democratic principles. Ennahda members and activists were optimistic that involvement in the give and take of democratic politics would incentivize the Salafis to moderate their more radical views. However, after the combination of two high-profile political assassinations and escalating jihadi and vigilante violence has triggered a deepening political crisis, Ennahda’s strategy of accommodation appears to have backfired.

You can read the full article on Sada's website here.

Fighting in Sebha Continues

Fighting continued in Sebha today as government forces supported by militias from Misrata retook the Temenhent air base from armed groups reported to supporters of the Gaddafi regime.  Government forces captured 18 armed men from the air base, though fighting continues in and around Sebha, with government reinforcements posted outside the city ready to enter to support sympathetic forces inside Sebha. Eighty-eight people have been killed and 130 wounded in fighting in the region over the last two weeks.  The fighting has overwhelmed local hospitals and led the International Committee of the Red Cross to express concern about the humanitarian situation in the Sebha. 

Fighting erupted in Sebha erupted two years ago following the killing of  the commander of the Sebha revolutionary brigade, Mansour al-Aswad, at the hands of Toubou militias from Murzuk.  al-Aswad's killing apparently in retaliation for his role in the clashes between Toubou and the Arab Awlad Sulaiman tribe in Sebha in 2012. As fighting picked up in Sebha between Toubou and the Awlad Sulaiman, an armed group supposedly affiliated with the former regime seized control of the Temenhent air base on 15 Janurary.  There is speculation that these militias were under the control of, or merely inspired by, Muammar Gaddafi's son Saadi who is currently living in exile and under house arrest in Niamey, Niger. These identity of these shadowy Gaddafists remains a mystery, with some accusing the government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan of manufacturing them to divert attention from its own failures.

Sobering article - How Libya could go bankrupt in under four years

Andrew Bauer of Revenue Watch poses what seems at first to be a proposterous question: will Libya go bankrupt in under four years? Libya, after all, has huge reserves of oil and gas, a healthy sovereign wealth fund and a relatively small population, facts that would seem to ensure years of consistent revenues.  The reality, however, is far less sanguine.  Revenues from oil and gas have plummeted due to strikes and blockades and government spending has skyrocketed, due mostly to the fact the the government employs up to half of the working population, which alone accounts for 38% of Tripoli's budget.  Bauer catalogues a laundry-list of other fiscal problems that, if left unaddressed, could drive quickly Libya to bankruptcy.

Bauer's article can be read in full here:

http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/will-oil-rich-libya-go-bankrupt-less-four-years

Frustration grows with congress in Libya

As violence flares up in several regions of the country and political gridlock polarizes Tripoli, frustration in the General National Congess is growing amongst Libyans.

Asmaa Elourfi writes for Magharebia on how the current crises are leading to a crisis of confidence in the GNC.

"Amid continuing violence across Libya, many are expressing frustration with the General National Congress (GNC) and voicing scepticism that a constitutional drafting committee can bring change.

"No date has been set yet for the 60-member panel election because of citizens' abstaining from registering. As of Thursday (January 23rd), just 1,101,025 Libyans had registered to vote for the constitution drafting panel, according to the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC). 

"Ahmed Ali El-Ourfi, a 48-year-old Arabic teacher in al-Marj, said: "People don't trust individuals, and although the constitution-drafting panel is elected, they consider it to be a formality; second, people were shocked with those whom they voted for in the GNC."

Public support for the GNC amongst the Libyan population was already low before the current crises, with 60% of respondents in a poll conducted in September, 2013, rating the GNC's performance as poor. The current crises will likely further erode public support for the GNC just as the government will need broad public support to face the significant challenges facing the country.

Simultaneous security and political crises challenge Zeidan government

Overlapping security and political crises have collided to create a serious challenge to the government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. While Zeidan may yet be able to weather the political challenges to his government in Tripoli, he will likely emerge in a weakened position. Forced to deal with a hostile General National Congress (GNC) with his legitimacy in question, Zeidan's government will find itself even less able to deal with the number of other regional security and political crises roiling Libya.

The main political challenge to Zeidan's government comes from the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya.  The JCP worked for weeks to gather the 120 votes necessary in the GNC to bring a vote of no confidence against Zeidan. Unable to marshal the votes, the JCP decided to quit the government and withdraw its five party members from Zeidan's cabinet. While the JCP failed to reach 120 votes, it did secure the signatures of 99 MPs out of the 194 in the GNC, showing the depth of disapproval for Zeidan's government.  This committed bloc will create significant difficulties for Zeidan as he tries to reform his cabinet and face several other simmering crises around Libya.

Meanwhile, simmering crises across Libya showcase the government's inability to act effectively and decisively to manage the country's security.  The death toll from clashes in Sebha between Toubou militias, militias affiliated with the Arab Awlad Sulieman tribe, and former Gadhafi loyalists, has reached 86, with over 100 wounded. 18 were killed in clashes in western Tripoli sparked when security forces raided the Wershefana area to arrest scores of wanted criminals.  In both of these cases, Zeidan was forced to call on militias for help in restoring calm.  This is a reversal for his government as it has called repeatedly for the militias and revolutionary brigades to disband or be absorbed into the government's security forces. In eastern Libya an assassination campaign against government sanctioned security forces in Benghazi continued this week, federalists remain in control of several of the region's oil export terminals, and conflict between Toubous and Arabs in southeastern Libya has led to tit-for-tat killings and attacks on oil and power generation facilities.

If and when Zeidan is able to emerge from political challenges in Tripoli, his government will be weakened and even less capable of dealing with the range of  security and political crises in Libya.  Despite a troubled relationship after the Gharghour incident, the government still relies on revolutionary brigades to project power, even within Tripoli itself.  While Zeidan has threatened force against the federalists blockading oil facilities in the east, it is unlikely he will have the means to do so any time in the near future.  And despite displeasure with Zeidan's leadership, it is unclear who would replace him and whether a new government would have any more success in facing Libya's immediate challenges.  

Desert Gives Al-Qaida Refuge After Mali Defeat

An excellent article from Paisely Dodds, Jamey Keaten and Aomar Ouali for NPR explores how southern Libya is quickly developing into a safe haven for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb following the French intervention in Mali in January, 2013.  The authors write:

"In the rocky mountains and dune-covered wastes of southwestern Libya, al-Qaida's North African branch has established a haven after French and West African forces drove them out of their fledgling Islamic state in northern Mali a year ago. Now, according to interviews with local soldiers, residents, officials and Western diplomats, it is restocking weapons and mining disaffected minorities for new recruits as it prepares to relaunch attacks. It's an al-Qaida pattern seen around the world, in hot spots such as Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and increasingly here in North Africa: seemingly defeated, the terror network only retreats to remote areas, regroups and eventually bounces back — pointing to the extreme difficulties involved in stamping out the threat."

The full article can be found here:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=263894840